EU Enlargement: Who Is Joining Europe and When?

EU enlargement is back at the top of the European political agenda after years of stagnation. Russia’s war in Ukraine fundamentally changed the calculus, turning what had been a slow, technocratic process into a geopolitical priority. Ukraine and Moldova are candidate countries. Montenegro could join as early as 2028. Albania is closing in on completing negotiations. And the question of whether and when the EU can absorb new members is reshaping European politics, budgets, and institutions.
For the Netherlands and its expat community, enlargement matters directly. More EU member states means changes to freedom of movement, EU budget contributions, voting weights, and the balance of power within European institutions.
Where Each Country Stands
Ukraine is the most significant and most complex case. Ukraine was granted EU candidate status in June 2022, weeks after Russia’s full-scale invasion began. Accession negotiations formally opened in June 2024, and by September 2025 Ukraine had successfully completed its screening process, the initial stage where the country’s laws and institutions are assessed against EU standards across all policy areas.
However, formal negotiations remain blocked at the first cluster, known as Fundamentals, covering rule of law, judiciary, and anti-corruption. The blockage is Hungary, whose Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has used his veto to prevent the unanimous Council approval required to open formal negotiating chapters. Technical work continues through informal channels. In March 2026, the European Commission held informal meetings with Ukraine’s deputy prime minister in Brussels, covering all six negotiating clusters at working level. EU ministers also endorsed a ten-point reform plan for Ukraine to implement in 2026, focusing on strengthening judicial independence and anti-corruption institutions.
The target date for completing Ukraine’s accession negotiations is 2028, though this is widely considered optimistic given the scale of reforms required and the ongoing war. Ukraine’s sheer size, 44 million people before the war and the largest country in Europe by area outside Russia, makes its accession politically and economically far more complex than any previous enlargement.
Moldova is in a similar position to Ukraine, with its formal accession process blocked by the same Hungarian veto that is holding up Kyiv. Informal technical work continues. From 1 January 2026, both Ukraine and Moldova joined the EU’s Roam Like at Home area, meaning residents of both countries can use their mobile phones in EU member states without roaming charges, a practical sign of deepening integration even before formal membership.
Montenegro is the closest to joining. Having begun accession negotiations in 2012, Montenegro has made significant progress in recent years after a period of stagnation. The European Council on Foreign Relations projects that Montenegro could close all remaining negotiation chapters in 2026 and join the EU by 2028, making it potentially the first new member state since Croatia in 2013. Montenegro has a population of just 600,000, making its accession relatively straightforward from an absorption capacity perspective.
Albania is assessed by the European Commission as capable of closing accession negotiations by 2027 if current reform momentum continues. Albania has made notable progress on judicial reform and anti-corruption measures in recent years.
Serbia remains the most advanced Western Balkan country in terms of negotiating chapters opened, but has fallen behind in actual reform implementation. The Commission’s 2025 enlargement package was clear that Serbia’s reform effort is falling short, particularly on rule of law and media freedom. Serbia’s ambiguous relationship with Russia following the Ukraine invasion has also complicated its European path.
Turkey formally remains a candidate country but accession negotiations have been effectively frozen since 2018. There is no realistic prospect of Turkish membership in any foreseeable timeframe given the political situation in both Turkey and the EU.
Western Balkans countries including Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Kosovo are at various earlier stages of the process, with Bosnia having only received candidate status in 2022 and Kosovo facing particular complications around non-recognition by five EU member states including Spain and Slovakia.
Why Enlargement Has Accelerated
The shift in European attitudes towards enlargement is remarkable. Before 2022, enlargement fatigue was the dominant mood in Brussels. Years of slow progress, democratic backsliding in candidate countries, and the experience of Hungary and Poland testing the limits of EU rule-of-law mechanisms had made many member states deeply cautious about taking in new members.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changed the political calculus almost overnight. Offering Ukraine a credible path to EU membership became a strategic response to Russian aggression, a signal that Europe’s borders were defined by democratic choice rather than military power.
The European Commission framed it explicitly: enlargement is not just a policy but a geopolitical necessity. Completing the EU means bringing stable democracies into the European orbit, reducing the grey zone of countries vulnerable to Russian influence, and building a larger, more resilient European economy.
The Obstacles Ahead
Despite the renewed political commitment, enormous practical obstacles remain.
Hungary’s veto is the most immediate blockage. Viktor Orbán’s government has used its veto to block formal progress on Ukraine and Moldova’s accession talks, and has linked the issue to various demands on EU funding and policy. The other 26 member states have found workarounds for some decisions but cannot circumvent the unanimity requirement for opening formal accession chapters.
Reform requirements are extensive. The accession process requires candidate countries to align their laws, institutions, and practices with the entire body of EU law across 35 policy chapters. For countries like Ukraine and Serbia, where rule of law, anti-corruption, and media freedom remain significant concerns, this is a decade-long project even under the best circumstances.
EU institutional reform is also needed before significant enlargement can proceed. The current EU decision-making structure, designed for 15 and later 27 member states, would become unwieldy with 35 or more. Questions about qualified majority voting, Commission composition, European Parliament representation, and budget contributions all need to be resolved. Ministers for EU affairs are currently preparing for the June 2026 European Council to discuss the Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034, which will need to account for enlargement scenarios.
Absorption capacity is a real concern for larger candidate countries. Ukraine in particular represents an economy and agricultural sector that would fundamentally change EU dynamics in areas like farm subsidies, cohesion funds, and voting weights.
What It Means for the Netherlands
The Netherlands has historically been a cautious voice on enlargement, prioritising absorption capacity and reform conditions over political gestures. The Jetten government’s position broadly continues this tradition: supporting the principle of enlargement while insisting on rigorous conditionality.
Dutch foreign minister Tom Berendsen has emphasised the Netherlands’ commitment to a credible European perspective for Ukraine and the Western Balkans, while maintaining that membership must be earned through genuine reform rather than granted for geopolitical reasons alone.
For Dutch residents and expats, enlargement has practical implications. Freedom of movement means citizens of new member states gain the right to live and work in the Netherlands without restrictions. Each previous enlargement round brought waves of workers to the Netherlands, particularly from Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. A future enlargement including Ukraine or Western Balkan countries would likely follow a similar pattern, though transitional arrangements limiting labour mobility for several years after accession are standard practice.
The Dutch EU budget contribution would also increase as the EU budget expands to support new member states’ cohesion and agricultural needs. The Netherlands is a net contributor to the EU budget, paying in more than it receives back.
The Timeline
Realistic timelines for enlargement, based on current progress and political conditions:
Montenegro: Possible EU membership by 2028 if negotiations close in 2026 as projected.
Albania: Possible completion of negotiations by 2027, membership by 2029 to 2030.
Moldova: Negotiations target of 2028 completion, membership by 2030 at earliest, subject to Hungary veto being resolved.
Ukraine: Negotiations target of 2028 completion is optimistic. Realistic membership by 2030 to 2032 at the earliest, and only if the war situation allows for the institutional reforms required.
Serbia and Western Balkans: Highly variable depending on reform progress. No firm timeline.
Summary
EU enlargement is back as a political priority driven by the geopolitical shock of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Montenegro is the closest to joining, potentially by 2028. Ukraine and Moldova face the double challenge of ongoing war and Hungary’s veto blocking formal progress. The practical obstacles of reform requirements, institutional capacity, and budget implications mean that even the most optimistic enlargement scenarios will play out over years and decades rather than months. For the Netherlands, enlargement means changes to freedom of movement, EU budget contributions, and the balance of power in European institutions that will shape Dutch society for a generation.


